Till the end, every night

1. 1

   500+ days by June 2026. That's the daily protest outside parliament since the government suspended EU accession on 28 November 2024.

2. 2

   About 250,000 in Daitove. With no stage and no leader, the resistance organised through open Facebook groups, marches by profession and neighbourhood, and funds for fines.

3. 3

   Clean funds, documentation and collective care kept it going, but it has not reached the majority who stay home or won new elections.

Copy summary

If you're new to this, start with the fundamentals, from the vote goal to what the research says. Read the fundamentals

The movement refuses spokespeople, but some people and organisations built visible parts of its infrastructure and told how it worked. They are the main sources for this playbook.

• Ilia Glonti

  Co-founder of the Daitove Facebook group

  Helped create the group on 30 April 2024 to house people arriving from the regions; it became an information hub during the election and, after 28 November, the main place to propose and call marches.

  Sources

• Nanuka Zhorzholiani

  TV presenter; founder of the Nanuka Foundation

  Opened her charity fund to protesters in 2024 to buy gas masks and helmets and help detainees; in early December 2024 she said it had received GEL 254,246 in donations in a single day.

  Sources

• Lela Tsiskarishvili (GCRT) and Human Rights House Tbilisi

  Rehabilitation of torture victims; fines fund

  GCRT set up emergency psychological support and, with GYLA, an independent mission to document torture; Human Rights House paid about 500 fines, close to GEL 500,000, by February 2025.

  Sources

• ISFED (International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy)

  Independent election observation

  On 26 October 2024 it deployed about 1,000 observers in polling stations, 85 mobile teams and 23 lawyers in a complaints centre, ran a parallel vote tabulation and, in 2026, keeps exposing networks of fake pro-government accounts.

  Sources

• My Vote coalition and GYLA

  Election observation and litigation

  My Vote, with 30 organisations, monitored 1,200 polling stations; the Georgian Young Lawyers' Association (GYLA) sought annulment at 2,263 stations using electronic voting and, with GCRT, documented the torture of detainees.

  Sources

• Gota Chanturia and Tatia Dvali

  Activists, Movement for Social Democracy

  Organised the daily marches from the public broadcaster to parliament against biased coverage; Chanturia has racked up 76 fines for blocking the road and gave the toughest assessment of 4 October 2025.

  Sources

• Dato Simonia

  Illustrator and graphic designer

  Created the series “Who stands on Rustaveli”, which draws each protester and tells their story, a way to give faces to a faceless movement.

  Sources

• Tamta Khalvashi

  Anthropologist and participant in the 2024 protests

  Wrote from inside the spring 2024 protests about student self-organisation and the birth of Daitove.

  Sources

• Protest.24 and Tako Lochoshvili

  Instagram account with the daily schedule; influencer critical of the government

  Protest.24 publishes the daily list of protests in Georgian and English, with tactics and resources; Lochoshvili says her followers are most engaged during protests, and she faces mass reporting aimed at getting her account closed.

  Sources

What organisers, observers, human rights defenders and protesters said about their own work. Paraphrases, with short quotes where essential.

• He compared the leaderless format to ancient Greek assemblies: nobody in the group wants to “speak down” to others, and anyone can propose a protest for the next day.

  Ilia Glonti (Daitove), OC Media, How social media has shaped Georgia's protests (14 Jan 2025)

• After police searched his home and took his phone and laptop, he said uncertainty about possible charges is part of the government's strategy.

  Ilia Glonti (Daitove), OC Media, How social media has shaped Georgia's protests (14 Jan 2025)

• In 2024 Daitove gathered about 170,000 people in a few days; in her view, refusing top-down planning was exactly what confused the government.

  Tamta Khalvashi, e-flux Notes, In the Name of Sovereignty (9 May 2024)

• Facebook groups were the main weapon against disinformation; when the crackdown reached Facebook, the people coordinating moved to Signal.

  Salome Gogebashvili, student at Tbilisi State University, NATO Association of Canada, “Democracy Is Never A Guarantee” (May 2025)

There were three linked waves: the fight against the “foreign agents” law in spring 2024, the 26 October election and the daily resistance that began on 28 November. Each wave left a tool for the next.

500+

consecutive days of protest outside parliament, as counted in Jun 2026estimate

~250k

members of the Daitove Facebook group, which proposes and calls marchesplatform figure

3,500+

independent observers from ISFED, My Vote and GYLA at the 2024 electioncampaign figure

~500

fines paid by a single fund, close to GEL 500,000, by Feb 2025campaign figure

From the law to daily resistance

1. 3 Apr–1 May 2024Georgian Dream reintroduces the “transparency of foreign influence” law. Daily protests; on 30 April Daitove is born to host people coming from the regions.
2. 11–14 May 2024About 50,000 march in Tbilisi; students at almost every major university boycott classes. On 14 May the law passes 84 to 30.
3. 18 May–2 Jun 2024President Salome Zourabichvili vetoes it; on 28 May the veto is overridden 84 to 4. A benefit concert raises US$124,700 for people arrested and fined.
4. 26 Oct 2024Election: 53.93% for Georgian Dream. More than 3,500 observers record vote buying, voter tracking and breaches of ballot secrecy; the opposition boycotts the new parliament.
5. 28 Nov 2024Kobakhidze suspends EU accession until 2028. The daily protest on Rustaveli begins; more than 450 detained in the first two weeks, most reporting ill-treatment.
6. 13 Dec 2024Day 16: marches of IT workers, entrepreneurs, students, musicians, lawyers and winemakers leave from different points at set times and converge on parliament at night.
7. Feb–Apr 2025Administrative detention rises to up to 60 days (7 Feb); accounts of five support funds are frozen (17 Mar); a FARA-style law and limits on foreign donations.
8. 4 Oct 2025Local elections boycotted by most of the opposition: 81.73% for Georgian Dream. About 20,000 take to the streets; a small group forces the presidential palace fence; the five organisers are detained that night and face criminal charges.
9. 6 Nov 2025For the first time police prevent the blocking of Rustaveli; the law already provided prison for repeat road-blocking. The protest moves to pavements and side streets.
10. Jun–Oct 2026The protest passes 500 days; the European Court of Human Rights communicates to the government the case of NGO accounts frozen in August 2025 (25 Jun); on 21 October the Constitutional Court begins hearing the bid to ban five opposition parties.

Three layers

Nobody ran the movement. Anyone could reinforce one of its three layers.

• Be therePresence outside parliament every night, marches by profession, neighbourhood and region during the day, symbolic dates and a sign with the day's number.
• Prove itObservers in polling stations, parallel tabulation, videos of police violence, testimony with forensic evidence, reports on networks of fake accounts.
• Carry it togetherFunds that pay fines and lawyers, psychological support, letters and birthdays outside prisons, help for people fired for protesting.

Georgia's resistance grew in a small, highly connected country, but one where power is concentrated in a single party, the courts and the police. Knowing this helps you choose what to swap in your own country.

Platforms

Facebook groups (Daitove)

Daitove (“stay”) was born to host people coming from the regions and reached about 250,000 members. Anyone can propose a march; if the group picks it up, it happens the next day.

Instagram (Protest.24)

Accounts such as Protest.24 published the daily list of protests, in Georgian and English, plus material on tactics.

Signal

According to a student who took part, when the government cracked down on organising via Facebook, coordinators moved to Signal.

TikTok, livestreams and news channels

Videos and livestreams by protesters showed police violence in real time; local Telegram channels and independent TV did the rest, including for the diaspora.

Solidarity funds and bank transfers

Foundations with accounts at Georgian banks took donations and paid fines, lawyers and protective equipment, until the prosecutor froze the accounts in March 2025.

Election observation network

ISFED, My Vote and GYLA, with more than 3,500 observers, a parallel tabulation, mobile teams and lawyers, produced the evidence behind the challenge to the election.

Local conditions

• The Constitution requires the government to pursue integration into the EU and NATO; that is why the suspension of 28 November 2024 became a cause that cuts across parties, with Georgian and European flags side by side.
• One party, Georgian Dream, has governed since 2012 and is linked to billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, sanctioned by the US in December 2024.
• Courts seen as captured: judges sanctioned by the UK, election complaints rejected, and almost every detainee fined or jailed in rushed hearings.
• A divided opposition with little public trust; that is why the movement refused party stages.
• The memory of 9 April 1989, when Soviet troops killed 21 people in Tbilisi, and of the 2008 war, with 20% of the territory occupied by Russia.
• Since December 2024, a series of laws raised fines, introduced prison for blocking roads and restricted foreign funding of NGOs and media.

The movement chose to distribute everything (the call, the care, the evidence, the money) so that arresting one person stops nothing, and stay on the street indefinitely instead of betting on one decisive day.

Three fronts

Presence without an owner

One fixed place, one fixed time, every day. Any group can bring its own march; nobody climbs onto a stage.

Evidence before accusation

Observers, video, testimony and reports before any denunciation. When the courts will not listen, the evidence is kept for international courts and for the future.

The cost shared

The state bets on fines, detentions and dismissals to wear people down. Funds, lawyers and collective care spread that cost across thousands.

The cycle of a day of resistance

The same cycle repeated hundreds of times, adjusted to each new law.

1. Propose Someone posts in the open group: “tomorrow, doctors leave such-and-such hospital at 5 p.m.” If the idea catches on, it becomes a call.
2. Call by identity Each march gathers a profession, a neighbourhood, a region or a school, with a symbolic starting point and its own time.
3. Converge The marches cross the city by day and arrive at night at the same place, where the daily presence is waiting for them.
4. Document Film the police, log detentions, keep names and times. The livestream protects and informs people far away.
5. Protect Lawyers on call, first aid, psychological support, real-time information on where riot police are operating.
6. Pay together Fines and fees paid by funds with receipts; the person fined is not left alone with the bill.
7. Adapt When a new law punishes a tactic, change the tactic, not the place: from the roadway to the pavements, from one avenue to side streets.
8. Remember Count the days, draw the people on the street, celebrate prisoners' birthdays outside the prisons, read their letters.

And again.

What you need to sustain a long, peaceful resistance against a government that will not give way, or to protect an election. It works for a national or a local movement, as long as it respects the rules on this page.

What works anywhere and what needs swapping. Choose your country at the top of the toolkit to see the equivalent tools.

Choose your country

Pick the moves that fit your context and add them to your kit. Each one works on its own or combined with moves from other playbooks.

1. Columns by profession that converge at night

   By day, each profession, neighbourhood or region sets off from its own symbolic point at its own time, and at night every column reaches the same fixed place, where the daily presence is waiting. In Georgia, on the 16th day of protest, columns of IT workers, business owners, students, musicians, lawyers and winemakers crossed Tbilisi and converged on Parliament.

   How to set it up, step by step

   Works when

   It works in a long resistance where everyone can bring their own network (colleagues, neighbours, people from home) without waiting for a stage.

   Don't use when

   It fails as a shortcut to a “decisive day”: an escalation announced by a few, without consulting the other columns, leaves more people in prison and more propaganda.

   1. D-day week Set the fixed place, the fixed time and the shared demand
   2. 1 week(s) after Recruit conveners by profession, neighbourhood and region
   3. 2 week(s) after Each column picks a symbolic starting point and its own time
   4. 2 week(s) after Publish the column calendar and the daily list in more than one language
   5. 2 week(s) after Hold the first night-time convergence at the fixed place
   6. 6 week(s) after Set the big weekend march for people who work during the week

   Team

   • March conveners: set the starting point, time and route and walk with the column
   • Daily presence: makes sure people are at the fixed place every night and counts the days
   • Daily list: publishes every column, time and starting point

   What to measure: Columns that actually left their starting point and reached the fixed place, and new people per night, counted by the conveners. Views don't count.

   Risks to watch: Any repeated tactic ends up punished by a new law: say in every call-out what the law bans now, change the tactic rather than the place, and decide any escalation together with the other groups.

   Add to my kitIn my kit

2. Open group, no owner, encrypted backup

   An open group where anyone can propose the next day’s march (if the group joins in, it happens), with pinned rules, admins with substitutes and an encrypted backup channel for coordinators. In Georgia, the Facebook group Daitove reached about 250,000 members; when the government cracked down on people organising on Facebook, coordinators moved to Signal, according to a student who took part.

   How to set it up, step by step

   Works when

   It works where people have little trust in parties and the government is looking for a leader to bring the movement down.

   Don't use when

   It fails without moderation: fake call-outs and rumours spread, and an open group is no place for lists of names or sensitive decisions.

   1. D-day week Open the group with conduct rules pinned at the top
   2. D-day week Choose admins and substitutes who don’t live at the same address
   3. D-day week Open the encrypted backup channel for coordinators and announce it
   4. 1 week(s) after Let anyone propose tomorrow’s march; the group decides by joining in
   5. 1 week(s) after Remove rumours and fake call-outs and pin the list of official channels
   6. 4 week(s) after Agree that any escalation is decided with the other groups, never by announcement

   Team

   • Admins: approve members, remove rumours and keep the list of backup channels
   • Substitutes: take over moderation if an admin is searched or detained
   • Encrypted coordination: handles on Signal what can’t sit in an open group

   What to measure: Proposals made in the group that became real marches the next day, counted by conveners; if only admins propose, the group is no longer open.

   Risks to watch: Visible admins get searched and charged: substitutes at different addresses, no lists of names in the group, and lawyers’ numbers on paper too.

   Add to my kitIn my kit

3. Fines and lawyers paid by a transparent fund

   A fund run by a registered organisation takes traceable donations and pays fines and legal fees directly, with public receipts, while lawyers appeal every fine. In Georgia, Human Rights House paid around 500 fines, close to GEL 500,000, by February 2025; in 2025, the Prosecutor’s Office froze the accounts of five funds, including the one linked to Human Rights House, alleging “sabotage”. That is why every payment needs a receipt from day one.

   How to set it up, step by step

   Works when

   It works when the state bets on fines, detentions and dismissals to wear people down one by one.

   Don't use when

   It fails with cash in envelopes or donations into personal accounts: it’s impossible to defend and hands the government its hidden-funding story.

   1. 1 week(s) after Open the legal hotline with lawyers on shifts
   2. 1 week(s) after Set up the fund in a registered body, with two people responsible and public accounts
   3. 1 week(s) after Open the fines log: amount, deadline, appeal, payment and receipt
   4. 2 week(s) after Pay every fine and fee directly, with the receipt published
   5. 3 week(s) after Appeal every fine in court, to leave a record
   6. 6 week(s) after Keep more than one fund, in more than one body and bank, with books ready for a judge
   7. 7 week(s) after Publish the fund’s accounts and the list of people detained and released

   Team

   • Fund treasury: named people who pay directly and publish every receipt
   • Duty lawyers: support detainees and appeal fines
   • Case log: keeps the sheet of fines, deadlines and appeals

   What to measure: Fines paid by the fund before the deadline with a published receipt, and detainees who had a lawyer within 24 hours.

   Risks to watch: Visible funds can be frozen on “sabotage” charges: follow fundraising law, spread across bodies and banks, and be ready to defend the fund in court, including internationally.

   Add to my kitIn my kit

4. An observer at every station, evidence first

   Accredited organisations place trained observers at polling stations, mobile teams and lawyers in a complaints centre, run a parallel count, and only then make accusations. In Georgia, more than 3,500 observers from ISFED, My Vote and GYLA recorded vote-buying and breaches of ballot secrecy; ISFED filed 294 complaints and the record underpinned the challenge to the election at home and abroad.

   How to set it up, step by step

   Works when

   It works ahead of any election where voters risk being pressured and the law allows independent observation.

   Don't use when

   It fails with confrontation or accusations without evidence: fighting people who watch voters puts the observer at risk, and an unproven post discredits everyone’s work.

   1. Week −13 Contact the observer organisations and learn the accreditation rules
   2. Week −11 Sign up and train volunteers: log with time, photo and station number
   3. Week −8 Set up the data hub and lawyers to handle complaints on the day
   4. Week −6 Deploy observers and mobile teams across polling stations
   5. Week −5 On the day, send every violation to the hub and run the parallel count
   6. Week −5 Publish the assessment only with evidence and file the formal complaints
   7. Week −4 Keep the evidence for the courts and for the future

   Team

   • Accredited observers: log and report without interfering with the vote
   • Complaints centre: lawyers who turn each record into a formal complaint
   • Parallel count: compares station results with the official ones

   What to measure: Polling stations with an accredited observer present from opening to count, and violations logged with time, photo and station that became formal complaints.

   Risks to watch: Captured courts may reject almost every complaint: log them anyway, because the evidence underpins the challenge abroad and future accountability.

   Add to my kitIn my kit

5. Document the violence, care for those hurt

   From the first minute, the network films police, logs detentions and collects testimony with consent and forensic evidence, connects victims with doctors and psychologists, and keeps solidarity alive with those in prison. In Georgia, GCRT set up emergency psychological support and, with GYLA, a mission to document torture; according to the Public Defender, between 78% and 88% of detainees said they had been mistreated.

   How to set it up, step by step

   Works when

   It works in any protest at risk of police violence, especially where the courts punish no one today.

   Don't use when

   It fails if material circulates without consent or stays only on the phone of whoever filmed it, which can be seized.

   1. D-day week Film the police and log detentions with name, time and place
   2. 1 week(s) after Open the abuse documentation form, with consent
   3. 1 week(s) after Connect every victim with volunteer doctors and psychologists
   4. 2 week(s) after Keep copies of the evidence off the phones and outside the country
   5. 3 week(s) after Report mistreatment to the Public Defender and international bodies
   6. 4 week(s) after Write to prisoners and organise visits and birthdays outside the prisons

   Team

   • Documentation and care: collects testimony and links victims to doctors and psychologists
   • Lawyers: turn the records into formal complaints
   • Memory and solidarity: write to prisoners and give a face to those behind bars

   What to measure: Abuse testimonies documented with consent and forensic evidence that became formal complaints, and victims who reached medical or psychological care.

   Risks to watch: Exposing victims without permission breaks data protection law and puts them at risk: consent only, faces covered when needed, and copies kept away from anyone who could seize them.

   Add to my kitIn my kit

For a movement that knows it will not win in a day. The first weeks build the infrastructure; the following ones, the rhythm. Your progress is saved in this browser.

Georgia's resistance stayed legitimate only because it was peaceful, documented and out in the open.

Peaceful and unarmed protest

Georgia's Constitution and Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights protect peaceful assembly. No violence against people or property, even in the face of provocation.

Know the law as it changes

In Georgia, fines, maximum detention, rules on masks, prior notice and road-blocking all changed. Keep the legal guide up to date and tell each person the risk they are running.

Money in the open

Funds with a registered entity, traceable donations, direct payments, public receipts. That is what lets you defend the fund in court.

Accredited observation

Observers follow electoral law, carry accreditation and record; they do not interfere with voting or confront anyone.

Consent and data protection

The injured, detainees and families appear only with permission. The GDPR, Brazil's LGPD and Georgia's data protection law also apply to those who document.

Real people only

No fake accounts, bots or bought likes. Exposing the opponent's inauthentic networks is legitimate; imitating them is not.

Right to a lawyer

Anyone detained has the right to a lawyer and to dignified treatment. Share the legal hotline before every march and report ill-treatment to the Public Defender and to international bodies.

Holding on is not winning

After more than 500 days, there have been no new elections and no return to the EU path. In the 2025 local elections Georgian Dream took 81.73% on 40.93% turnout, and in October 2026 the Constitutional Court is hearing a petition by 88 MPs to ban five opposition parties, with no ruling yet.

The majority who stay home

Georgian analysts point out that the movement reacts more than it proposes and does not reach the large majority who stay away from the protests.

The human cost

Hundreds reported ill-treatment in November 2024 alone; according to the Public Defender, between 78% and 88% of those detained in 2024–2025 said they were ill-treated. In June 2026 more than 150 people remained in custody in protest-related cases, and only five police officers had been charged. In December 2025, a BBC investigation suggested the 2024 water cannons may have used a First World War chemical agent, “camite”, based on accounts from protesters, a paediatrician who collected cases and former police officers. Prime Minister Kobakhidze acknowledged a substance had been mixed into the water but denied it was camite; the State Security Service opened an investigation and summoned interviewees for questioning.

Escalation without a mandate

4 October 2025 showed the risk of a small group deciding for the movement: organisers detained and charged, dozens detained and a pretext for more repression. Not a step to copy.

Fatigue, emigration and division

Turnout fell from tens of thousands to hundreds a night. Fines, dismissals and prison push people out of the country, and groups split even over supporting other struggles.

Infrastructure that can be attacked

Admins raided, funds frozen, NGOs cut off from foreign funding: anything visible can be a target.

The fake-account war

ISFED exposed networks of hundreds of inauthentic pro-government accounts, one of them with 424 profiles created in two days in August 2026. Responding with fake accounts would destroy the movement's credibility; it is listed here as a risk, not a tactic.

Five questions to confirm the essentials. Each answer comes with an explanation.

This playbook was built from accounts by organisers, election observers, human rights defenders and protesters, confirmed by Georgian and international press published between May 2024 and October 2026.

Updated 26 October 2026