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Germany · 2021–2025

The other side: a case study, not a model

First in the feed

The AfD spent years almost alone on TikTok and came second in the 2025 federal election. This case study shows the mechanics, what never to copy and how to respond.

Case documented by Johannes Hillje, the University of Potsdam and the Bertelsmann Stiftung, Global Witness, CORRECTIV, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, ISD, the University of Copenhagen and the German press. An independent case study; it neither reproduces nor links to extremist content.

In 30 seconds

  1. 3×. The AfD joined TikTok years before the CDU; in 2022–2023, its Bundestag group's videos averaged three times the views of all other groups combined.

  2. 60–90 seconds. Speeches built to be clipped, many accounts reposting, and algorithms that, according to several audits, recommended AfD content beyond the party's share of posts.

  3. Native formats, consistency and distribution by real people can be learned; fake profiles, hate speech and disguised ads, never. Counter it: go first, steal the agenda, report violations.

How to read this case

There is no toolkit to copy here. You get the mechanics of what worked, the red lines that were crossed (and what they cost), and how to respond when this playbook is used against you.

See the lessons How to respond

If you're new to this, start with the fundamentals, from the vote goal to what the research says. Read the fundamentals

Who did it

No interviews were found in which the AfD's digital team explains its strategy in detail; the strategists' voices come from public…

No interviews were found in which the AfD's digital team explains its strategy in detail; the strategists' voices come from public statements reported by the press. The rest of the case was documented by researchers, NGOs, journalists and courts. This page does not link to party or extremist accounts.

  • Erik Ahrens

    Former social media adviser to Maximilian Krah (according to the press); described by the Institut für Staatspolitik (Institute for State Policy) as the driving force behind Krah's TikTok campaign

    In talks and posts reported by the press, he compared TikTok to radio in the 1920s and said he wanted to bypass journalism to reach young people directly.

    Sources
  • Maximilian Krah

    AfD lead candidate in the 2024 European elections; member of the Bundestag since 2025

    He was the AfD's best-known face on TikTok in 2023–2024, with one-minute videos aimed at young men, until the platform removed his posts from the feed in March 2024.

    Sources
  • Ulrich Siegmund

    AfD lead candidate in Saxony-Anhalt

    The most-viewed German politician on TikTok in summer 2026: 28 million views between June and August, 64.5% of everything political accounts in the state received.

    Sources
  • Johannes Hillje

    Political and communications consultant

    Measured the social media presence of the Bundestag groups from 2022 to 2023 and explained how the AfD structures speeches so they can be turned into TikTok clips.

    Sources
  • University of Potsdam and Bertelsmann Stiftung

    Roland Verwiebe, Johannes Wolfgram and team; Amber Jensen (Bertelsmann)

    Used 268 simulated profiles to audit what TikTok, YouTube, Instagram and X recommended to 21- to 25-year-olds before the 2025 election, and run the Potsdam Social Media Monitor.

    Sources
  • Global Witness

    Investigative NGO

    Tested the For You feeds of TikTok, X and Instagram before the 2025 election and found that 78% of party-political recommendations on TikTok were pro-AfD.

    Sources
  • CORRECTIV

    Investigative newsroom (Kimberly Nicolaus, Gabriele Scherndl and the data team)

    Identified 60 fake profiles posing as the AfD on TikTok ahead of the Saxony and Thuringia elections; almost all disappeared a day after the platform was contacted.

    Sources
  • Marcus Bösch (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung)

    Researcher on TikTok propaganda, HAW Hamburg

    Analyzed the 2024 European campaign on TikTok and showed that more videos did not mean more reach, and that the most-viewed videos about Krah came from unofficial accounts.

    Sources

In their own words

Paraphrases of strategists' statements as reported by the press, and researchers' findings.

Paraphrases of strategists' statements as reported by the press, and researchers' findings. Short quotes in quotation marks, translated. Slogans that attack groups are not reproduced.

6 more quotes
  • AfD speeches in the Bundestag are “platform-ready”: short, radical passages that can be cut into 60 or 90 seconds, a direct transfer from the chamber to the feed.

    Johannes Hillje, Leinetal24, “Doppel-Strategie”, Feb 20, 2024

  • On TikTok, reach depends on engagement, not followers: the SPD's lead candidate posted 82 videos and got about 1.9 million views; the ten most-viewed videos tagged #Krah totaled about 5 million, none from an official account.

    Marcus Bösch, researcher (FES), FES, “Von Reichweite und Algorithmen”, Sep 2024

  • Recommendation algorithms now decide which political messages reach young people at all.

    Amber Jensen, Bertelsmann Stiftung, taz, on the Univ. of Potsdam/Bertelsmann study, Nov 5, 2025

  • Across about 48,000 videos from the 2025 campaign, #afd led every single day; the visibility came mainly from ordinary users, supporters and critics, not from party accounts.

    Jochen Kinast and Franziska Marquart, University of Copenhagen, Communications, May 2026 (University of Copenhagen news release)

  • Beyond its official account, the AfD benefits from a considerable number of unofficial fan accounts; right-leaning users see a lot of AfD content, left-leaning users a more varied mix.

    Mauritius Dorn, ISD Germany, ISD, interview with the BBC, Feb 9, 2025

  • Social media played a role, but it was not the main reason for the youth vote: cost of living, housing and a preference for parties that had not been in government weighed more.

    Jasmin Riedl, political scientist (Bundeswehr University Munich), ZDFheute, Feb 24, 2025

The story

While the other parties debated whether they should be on a Chinese-owned platform, the AfD was already posting regularly.

While the other parties debated whether they should be on a Chinese-owned platform, the AfD was already posting regularly. By the time the others arrived, the party had a head start of years, a network of accounts reposting and a format tuned to the algorithm.

20.8%
for the AfD in the federal election of Feb 23, 2025: second place and 152 MPs (Federal Returning Officer)
3×
average views of the AfD Bundestag group's TikTok videos, Jan 2022–Dec 2023, compared with all other groups combined (Hillje)
11–12 min
before a new profile saw an #afd video; the first #spd video appeared after about 70 minutes (Potsdam/Bertelsmann)
41%
of voters aged 18 to 24 voted AfD in Saxony-Anhalt on Sep 6, 2026 (Infratest dimap, via KAS)

Five years

  1. Aug 2021–Jan 2022Alice Weidel opens a TikTok account; on January 27, 2022, the AfD's Bundestag group publishes its first post.
  2. May 2022TikTok blocks the party's official account without a public explanation; the AfD cries censorship and content starts circulating through the parliamentary group, individual politicians and fan accounts.
  3. 2023Between March and October the party account grows 83%; in January there were 134 accounts close to the AfD. Krah switches to shorter videos; in September, Ahrens is introduced by Götz Kubitschek at the Institut für Staatspolitik's summer academy in Schnellroda.
  4. Mar 19–20, 2024TikTok removes Krah's videos from the For You feed for 90 days over repeated violations; five videos are deleted for hate speech. The platform also takes down a network of 32 inauthentic accounts pushing pro-AfD content and Russian state media narratives.
  5. May–Jun 2024Krah is barred from campaigning by his own party after remarks about the SS to an Italian newspaper; even so, the ten most-viewed #Krah videos total about 5 million views, all from unofficial accounts.
  6. Sep 2024Elections in Saxony, Thuringia and Brandenburg: the AfD wins 31% and 38% among under-25s in the first two states. CORRECTIV exposes 60 fake AfD profiles with more than 6 million likes; almost all are gone within a day.
  7. Feb 20–23, 2025Global Witness publishes its feed test (78% pro-AfD on TikTok). In the election, the AfD takes 20.8% nationwide; among 18- to 24-year-olds, Die Linke comes first (25–26%) and the AfD second (21%).
  8. May 2 and 8, 2025The Verfassungsschutz classifies the AfD as “confirmed right-wing extremist”; the AfD sues and, six days later, the agency undertakes to treat it only as a suspected case until a court rules.
  9. Nov 2025–Feb 2026The Potsdam and Bertelsmann study shows the AfD with 21.5% of uploads and 37.4% of recommendations. On February 26, 2026, the Cologne Administrative Court provisionally bars the classification.
  10. Sep 6, 2026Saxony-Anhalt: the AfD wins 43.8% and 39 of 83 seats, short of an absolute majority; 41% among 18- to 24-year-olds. Its lead candidate had been the most-viewed politician on TikTok that summer.

Three layers of accounts

Reach did not come from one account but from three layers that fed each other, and from critics, who also generated engagement.

  • OfficialThe Bundestag group, Alice Weidel, Ulrich Siegmund, Maximilian Krah and many MPs and candidates with their own accounts, frequently posting short clips of speeches and comments on current events.
  • Fans and editsFan accounts, edit pages and micro-influencers who reposted and remixed, partly coordinated via Telegram according to FES, including through the “TikTok-Guerilla” channel opened in 2024 by a member of Krah’s staff (his team denied giving any mandate). This layer also included fake profiles imitating the party, documented by CORRECTIV and removed.
  • Wider networkAlternative media, libertarian and misogynist podcasts and influencers, the party's youth organization and the identitarian scene, which repeated topics and framings without formally being part of the campaign.
What isn't known. Views and hashtags measure visibility, not support or votes; several studies say so explicitly.

The audits use small samples (Global Witness: 9 accounts, 15 minutes) or simulated profiles and cannot separate the algorithm's effect from genuine popularity; TikTok disputes the methodology and says it does not favor any party. Youth vote figures come from exit polls by different institutes (FGW, Infratest) and vary by a point or two; the 2024 Saxony and Thuringia figures come from t-online. No interviews with the AfD's digital team were found; Erik Ahrens's statements are as reported by the press, and his later relationship with Krah or the party has not been verified. The Verfassungsschutz classification is not final: the main case is still pending as of October 2026.

The terrain

Germany had about 21 million TikTok users, with teenagers spending 60 to 90 minutes a day on the platform, and mainstream parties that only…

Germany had about 21 million TikTok users, with teenagers spending 60 to 90 minutes a day on the platform, and mainstream parties that only opened accounts in 2024. The AfD, already ahead on Facebook and YouTube, found the field almost empty.

Platforms

TikTok (For You feed)
The feed recommends videos to people who don't follow the account, so small accounts can reach millions. For the AfD it was a direct line to under-25s, bypassing the filter of journalism.
The Bundestag chamber as a studio
Speeches with short, harsh passages, cut into 60–90 seconds and posted by the parliamentary group and individual MPs. Parliament provided a stage, legitimacy and fresh raw material every day.
Fan accounts, edit pages and Telegram
After the party's official account was blocked in May 2022, according to FES, posting shifted to fan accounts coordinated in a Telegram group. Edits presented Alice Weidel in an entertainment register. In spring 2024, shortly after TikTok restricted Krah’s account, one of his staff opened the Telegram channel “TikTok-Guerilla”, which taught sympathisers to make and spread viral videos and reportedly lured them with prize draws, according to reports including CORRECTIV’s; a similar channel, “Guerilla Videos”, gave instructions for earning money through affiliate links. The AfD said it had no contact or cooperation with the group, and Krah’s team said it had given no mandate.
YouTube and Facebook
An Intermate analysis from August 2023 already put the AfD ahead on Facebook and YouTube; in the 2025 Potsdam audit, about half the party content shown across the four platforms, YouTube included, came from the AfD.
Alternative media and influencer network
Outlets such as Nius (up to nine videos a day in 2023), crypto-libertarian podcasts and micro-influencers with thousands to tens of thousands of followers amplified topics and clips.
X
In the Global Witness test, 64% of party-political recommendations on X were pro-AfD; X did not respond to the investigation.

Local conditions

  • Others arrived late: Alice Weidel has been on TikTok since August 2021 and the AfD's Bundestag group since January 2022; the CDU only launched its main account in February 2024, and in December 2023 the CDU and the Greens were still not posting on TikTok.
  • Data protection concerns about a Chinese-owned platform delayed parties and the government from joining.
  • Voting at 16 in the 2024 European elections and in some states, such as Brandenburg, increased the weight of the teenage audience.
  • Eastern Germany, where the AfD is the largest party in several regions, and material worries (cost of living, housing) very present among young people.
  • A gender gap among the young: men aged 18 to 29 more conservative, women more liberal, according to a Financial Times analysis cited by the press.
  • Monitoring by the Verfassungsschutz (Germany's domestic intelligence agency for protecting the constitution) and EU platform rules (DSA) in force throughout the period.

The method

Nobody published a manual.

Nobody published a manual. What follows are the mechanics reconstructed from analyses by Hillje, FES, Potsdam and the press. They are described here so they can be understood, not copied.

Three fronts

Get there first and stay
Entry in 2021–2022, when competitors were absent, and constant posting ever since. Hillje calls it a first-mover advantage: audiences and the algorithm got used to these faces first.
Produce for the feed
Videos under a minute, a hook in the first seconds, one emotional topic per video and speeches written to be cut. Deliberate amateurism read as authenticity.
Distribute through many
Many politicians' accounts and a layer of fans and edits reposting, plus engagement from critics. When one account went down, the content lived on in others.

The life cycle of a clip

From the chamber to the feed, each piece followed a similar circuit, according to the analyses cited.

  1. Scene A speech, interview or intervention with a short, harsh, emotional passage on migration, cost of living, war or “elites”.
  2. Cut A clip of 60–90 seconds or less, with big captions and a hook at the start.
  3. Multiplication Posted by the parliamentary group, the politician and several fan and edit accounts, almost simultaneously.
  4. Engagement Comments, duets and remixes (including from critics) signal relevance to the algorithm.
  5. Amplification The For You feed takes the video to people who follow no one from the AfD; audits measured recommendations above the party's share of posts.
  6. Restriction When there are violations, the platform deletes videos, removes accounts from the feed or takes down fake profiles.
  7. Censorship narrative The restriction becomes more content (“censorship”) and the material resurfaces through other accounts, restarting the cycle.

And again.

What to learn, and what never to copy

Part of what the AfD did is simple platform competence, which any democratic campaign can use transparently.

Part of what the AfD did is simple platform competence, which any democratic campaign can use transparently. Another part is what platforms, journalists and the state documented as abuse.

Never copy

5
Fake profiles and impersonation
CORRECTIV found 60 profiles posing as the AfD, with more than 6 million likes, and 44 official AfD accounts followed at least one of them; almost all were removed within a day for breaking the rules. In 2024 TikTok also took down a network of 32 inauthentic pro-AfD accounts.
Hate speech and dehumanization
Five of Krah's videos were deleted for hate speech and his posts were kept out of the feed for 90 days. The Verfassungsschutz based its 2025 classification on an ethnic concept of the people; the Cologne court, even while suspending it, saw unconstitutional elements, especially anti-Muslim demands.
Disguised advertising
Global Witness found a paid pro-AfD partnership with more than 600,000 views; TikTok removed it for violating its branded content policy.
Disinformation and unproven claims
The fake profiles spread false claims and defamatory attacks; in Brandenburg, researcher Rüdiger Maas pointed to TikTok as an accelerator of unverified claims. The result is takedowns and lost credibility for whoever uses them.
Exploiting teenagers' attention to manipulate
Asked on X whether he wanted to manipulate young people, Ahrens replied "yes", according to press reports. That is the opposite of a democratic campaign: persuade with facts and consent, never exploit the vulnerability of minors.

You can learn

6
Be there early and consistently
Open accounts before the campaign and post every week. Hillje called the democratic parties' absence an excuse that betrays ignorance; in 2025 Die Linke showed it was still possible to make up ground.
One idea per video, under a minute
Write public statements with passages that stand on their own in 30–90 seconds, with a hook and captions. True content, but in the platform's format.
Many real faces, all identified
MPs, councillors, candidates and activists with their own accounts, clearly labeled as such. Distribution by real people, with no anonymous profiles pretending to be something else.
Talk, don't broadcast
Reply to comments, speak as an equal, address concrete questions. FES recommends dialogue and messages with a concrete benefit in the first seconds.
Democratic emotions
Hillje talks about communication based on democratic emotions: hope, righteous anger, humor, care. Die Linke, with Heidi Reichinnek on TikTok, led among young voters in 2025, in an election where cost of living and housing weighed heavily, according to Riedl.
Measure the feed, not just followers
Track views, where recommendations come from and topics, as the Potsdam Social Media Monitor and Global Witness do, and remember that visibility is not votes.

How to respond

6
Occupy the space first
In the short term, the Potsdam/Bertelsmann study recommends that under-represented parties strengthen their TikTok presence with respectful, dialogue-based communication. Latecomers compete for a feed that is already occupied.
Steal the agenda, don't just rebut
Critical comments and duets also give the original video reach. As Der Freitag put it, the difference lies not in who contests the AfD but in who steals its scene: produce your own content on the topic, in your own framing.
Report what breaks the rules
Impersonation, hate and undeclared advertising violate platform rules: reports by CORRECTIV and Global Witness led to quick takedowns. In the EU, the DSA requires very large platforms to mitigate election risks; the Commission opened proceedings against TikTok after Romania's 2024 elections.
Digital literacy and control over the feed
In the medium term, the study recommends digital education and more user control over their own feeds, so young people understand how the algorithm chooses what they see.
Demand algorithmic transparency
In the long term, binding transparency obligations and independent audits. Support and use research like that from Potsdam, Copenhagen and Global Witness instead of assumptions.
Talk about real concerns
For Riedl, cost of living and housing weighed more than social media. Trusted messengers who address concrete problems compete better than campaigns about the AfD itself.

Practice

Rehearse with the case's missions and situations.

What would you do?

Six moments from the point of view of a democratic campaign facing this playbook. Choose and see what the evidence suggests.

Rules

What applied in this case: Germany's Basic Law, court rulings, EU rules and the platform's own policies.

What applied in this case: Germany's Basic Law, court rulings, EU rules and the platform's own policies.

Classification by the Verfassungsschutz
On May 2, 2025, the agency classified the AfD as “confirmed right-wing extremist”, based on an ethnic concept of the people. On May 8 it undertook to treat the party only as a suspected case until a court ruling.
Cologne's provisional ruling
On February 26, 2026, the Cologne Administrative Court provisionally barred the classification: it saw indications of unconstitutional aims within the party, but no proof that they define the party as a whole. The main case continues, and the AfD remains under observation as a suspected case.
State level
The classification of the AfD in Saxony was upheld by the higher administrative court in Bautzen; Thuringia's is in force but was not challenged; Saxony-Anhalt's awaits the final decision in Cologne.
TikTok Community Guidelines
Hate speech, impersonation of people and organizations, inauthentic behavior and undisclosed branded content are prohibited. Sanctions seen in this case: deleted videos, accounts kept out of the feed for 90 days, a blocked account, profiles and networks taken down.
Digital Services Act (EU)
Very large platforms must assess and mitigate risks to electoral integrity. The European Commission opened formal proceedings against TikTok on these grounds after Romania's 2024 elections.
Data protection
The GDPR applies to campaigns: lists, messages and targeting only with consent and a clear purpose.
Only real, identified people
For democratic campaigns: no fake profiles, bots, bought accounts or paid influencers without disclosure. Coordinating real people to say what they think is allowed; what platforms punish is organizing likes, follows or hashtags to game the algorithm. X, for example, bans trading engagement and using a trending hashtag to manipulate the conversation.

Limits

What this method doesn't do, and when it fails.
Visibility is not votes
Potsdam and Copenhagen state explicitly that they measure visibility, not support. Hashtags include criticism, and many people see the AfD without voting for it.
Algorithm or popularity?
No study can separate the algorithm's push from genuine popularity; TikTok disputes the methodologies and says it does not favor any party.
The left grew too
In 2025 Die Linke led among 18- to 24-year-olds (25–26%) and, in the Potsdam study, received almost three times its share of uploads in recommendations. The feed rewards the extremes and emotion, not just the right.
Posting more isn't enough
The CDU posted 69% more than the AfD in 2025, according to Global Witness, without getting the same reach; the Potsdam study concludes that engagement tactics, similar across all parties, don't explain the difference.
Social media wasn't the main cause
For Riedl, cost of living, housing and fatigue with the governing parties weighed more. Researchers consulted by the KAS doubt that TikTok decides elections.
The cost for the faces
Krah lost reach in 2024 and was removed from the European campaign and the delegation in the European Parliament; even so, he won a direct mandate in 2025 with 44.2%. Exposure has costs, but not necessarily electoral ones.
No majority
Even with 43.8% in Saxony-Anhalt in 2026, the AfD ended up with 39 of 83 seats, short of an absolute majority; digital visibility doesn't guarantee government.

Check yourself

Five questions on the mechanics, the red lines and the responses.

Five questions on the mechanics, the red lines and the responses. Each answer comes with an explanation.

1. In the Potsdam and Bertelsmann study of the 2025 election, how did the AfD's uploads compare with its recommendations?
2. Why doesn't “posting more videos” explain the AfD's success?
3. What happened to the 60 fake AfD profiles identified by CORRECTIV in 2024?
4. Why can a critical duet help the video it is trying to rebut?
5. What is the status of the AfD's federal classification as right-wing extremist as of October 2026?

Sources

This case study draws on researchers' analyses, platform audits, official rulings and documents, and reporting published between November…

This case study draws on researchers' analyses, platform audits, official rulings and documents, and reporting published between November 2023 and September 2026. All pages were opened and read on October 26, 2026. No source links directly to extremist content.

30 sources

Who did it

Data

Press

Analysis

Updated 26 October 2026

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