From TV studio to feed

1. 1

   29.99% → 55.65%. Milei came second in the first round (Sergio Massa had 36.78%) and won the November 19, 2023 runoff with 14.55 million votes.

2. 2

   83% of the largest fan channel's videos came from other media, such as TV interview clips. The TikTok team was aged 21 and 22.

3. 3

   Alongside it, according to fact-checkers and NGOs, a network of accounts and operators included inauthentic accounts, disinformation and harassment of journalists.

4. 4

   Fine to learn: native format, several layers of real creators, talking about young people's everyday lives. Never copy: fake accounts, deepfakes, harassment campaigns.

5. 5

   How to respond: have your own messengers before the crisis, don't amplify provocations, and document and report what breaks the law.

Copy summary

If you're new to this, start with the fundamentals, from the vote goal to what the research says. Read the fundamentals

Part of Milei's digital team gave interviews in 2023; his chief strategist, Santiago Caputo, almost never gives interviews and declined to speak to the outlets that profiled him. The rest of the case was documented by fact-checkers, NGOs, researchers and journalists. This page does not link to accounts of the party, operators or influencers.

• Santiago Caputo

  Political consultant, Milei's chief strategist; began his career with Jaime Durán Barba

  Met Milei in 2021, left the consultancy Move for the 2023 campaign and was called by Milei an "architect" of the victory; the press, citing anonymous sources, credits him with overseeing the government's digital apparatus.

  Sources

• Fernando Cerimedo

  Digital consultant (Numen group); owner of the La Derecha Diario domain, according to Chequeado

  Was head of communication of the 2023 presidential campaign (unpaid, he says) after working for Bolsonaro; told the press he controlled about 50,000 accounts to monitor the conversation, and later distanced himself from Milei's circle, according to La Nación.

  Sources

• Iñaki Gutiérrez and Eugenia Rolón

  Managers of Milei's and Victoria Villarruel's TikTok accounts (aged 22 and 21 in 2023)

  Made the campaign's short videos, with Q&As and topics from young people's daily lives, and explained the strategy in interviews after the win.

  Sources

• Santiago Oría

  Filmmaker, director of the campaign spots; later Director of Audiovisual Production at the Presidency

  Made the 48-second TV spots, designed to show a calmer Milei to older voters while TikTok spoke to the young.

  Sources

• Tomás Jurado and Mariano Pérez

  Creators of the YouTube channel "El Peluca Milei" and the BreakPoint streams

  Clipped TV interviews and streamed in support of Milei; Jurado's channel had over 900,000 subscribers in 2023 and, according to Perfil, they filmed in the offices of the brokerage of Ramiro Marra, a party candidate. Both lived off the monetisation of their own posts, according to Letra P; by 2024 Jurado had become Juan Doe’s right hand at the Casa Rosada.

  Sources

• Juan Doe and Daniel Parisini (“Gordo Dan”)

  Government director of digital strategy and streamer; leading figures of Las Fuerzas del Cielo

  According to Letra P (Nov 2024), they were X/Twitter posters who rose during the campaign and whom Caputo took into Las Fuerzas del Cielo: Caputo keeps an office in the Casa Rosada for the group, which Doe leads; Parisini launched a streaming channel in 2024 and made his dependence on Caputo plain.

  Sources

• Chequeado and the CLIP network ("Mercenarios Digitales")

  Argentine fact-checker and Latin American investigative journalism consortium

  Investigated Cerimedo's career, La Derecha Diario and the false claims it published, and later documented the May 2025 deepfakes of Macri and Lospennato.

  Sources

• Amnesty International Argentina

  Human rights NGO (executive director Mariela Belski)

  Took to the Inter-American Commission, in July 2024 and April 2026, cases of online harassment of journalists in which the president himself appears as the main aggressor.

  Sources

• Academic researchers

  Candela Cuenca (UNSAM); Núria Roca Trenchs (UIC) and Damián Fernández Pedemonte (Universidad Austral)

  Measured how fan YouTube recycled TV and analysed 200 TikTok videos by Milei and Trump, finding a youthful aesthetic, affective polarisation and, in some cases, hate and disinformation.

  Sources

Paraphrases of statements by the team and operators, as reported by the press, and findings by researchers and NGOs. Figures given by the interviewees themselves were not verified. Insults and slogans against groups are not reproduced.

• They said they talked about young people's daily worries (moving out of their parents' home, working in their field, making it to the weekend) and that traditional politicians talked down to them. Rolón said the campaign cost zero pesos in ads and staff.

  Iñaki Gutiérrez and Eugenia Rolón, TikTok team, Meganoticias, interview, 4 Dec 2023

• He claimed the campaign had reached more than 300 million people, with an average of six million views per video. These are his figures, not audited.

  Iñaki Gutiérrez, Perfil, "El ejército de Milei en las redes, uno por uno", 15 Sept 2023

• He explained that the spots were meant to reach middle-aged and older voters, less drawn to the online style, by showing a calmer Milei; after the primaries, the campaign had to take fewer risks and be more precise.

  Santiago Oría, spot director, Letra P, "Austeridad y precisión", 23 Sept 2023

• He told the journalists of the Mercenarios Digitales investigation that he uses fake accounts to influence algorithms, not to attack opponents, and called La Derecha Diario's false stories "chiquilinadas" (childish pranks).

  Fernando Cerimedo, digital consultant, Chequeado/CLIP, "La opaca historia de Fernando Cerimedo", 31 July 2023

In under three years, a TV commentator elected deputy in 2021 became president. The campaign had little declared money, many creators and an agenda strategy made of shock, symbols and clips. After the inauguration, the same apparatus was used to govern, and came under investigation.

55.65%

for Milei in the 19 Nov 2023 runoff, with 14.55 million votes

19.9M × 162K

TikTok views for Milei and Massa, according to the consultancy Ad Hoc (cited by Perfil, Sept 2023)

83%

of videos on the "El Peluca Milei" fan channel during the campaign came from other media, mostly TV (UNSAM)

111 of 257

cases of violence against journalists up to Nov 2025 had the president as the main aggressor (FOPEA, via Amnesty)

From 2021 to 2026

1. 2021Milei runs in the legislative election in Buenos Aires; he meets Santiago Caputo through Ramiro Marra. About 140 unpaid activists act as extras in a spot, according to Santiago Oría.
2. 4 Nov 2022Fernando Cerimedo hosts a livestream called "Brasil fue robado" (Brazil was stolen), seen by about 400,000 people, questioning Lula's win with false information; Brazil's electoral court (TSE) suspends accounts of La Derecha Diario Brasil and his own.
3. May 2023Cerimedo, by then head of campaign communication, tells the press he controls about 50,000 accounts to monitor the conversation and defends "negative campaigns".
4. 13 Aug 2023Milei comes first in the open primaries (PASO), with about 30%. Fan videos pass a million views.
5. 22 Oct 2023First round: Massa 36.78%, Milei 29.99%, Bullrich 23.81%. Bullrich and Macri back Milei; both sides use AI-generated images and fear campaigns.
6. 19 Nov 2023Milei wins the runoff with 55.65%. He takes office on 10 December; RSF warns about his aggressiveness towards the press.
7. 2024According to La Política Online, Caputo asks the government for one spending cut a week to feed social media. In July, Amnesty reports to the IACHR the harassment of about 30 journalists; in November, the group Las Fuerzas del Cielo is launched, which figuratively called itself Milei's "armed wing" and became the subject of a court complaint.
8. 17–18 May 2025On the eve of the Buenos Aires city election, during the electoral silence, fake AI videos of Macri and Lospennato circulate on X; the electoral court orders their removal and X does not comply.
9. Aug–Oct 2025On 14 August, according to RSF, a prosecutor formally names Milei, members of the government and followers as suspects (imputación) over threats and harassment of journalist Julia Mengolini. On 7 September, the party loses the Buenos Aires province election by almost 14 points; on 26 October, it wins the national midterms with over 40%.
10. Apr–Aug 2026In April, Amnesty goes back to the IACHR and journalists' access to the Casa Rosada is cut. On 18 August, Cerimedo is detained in Bolivia, under investigation for attempted femicide; the government says his role was limited.

Three layers of communication

Reach came from three layers feeding each other, and the lines between them were not always transparent.

• OfficialMilei, who wrote his own X and Instagram posts; Gutiérrez and Rolón's TikTok team; Romo on the party account; Oría on the TV spots. Little declared ad money, according to the team itself.
• Fan creatorsUnofficial YouTube channels, streams and TikTok accounts, mostly of young men, who clipped TV and interviews. Some had close ties to the campaign, such as filming in the offices of a candidate's brokerage.
• Para-official networkAligned sites such as La Derecha Diario, Cerimedo's account structure and, after the inauguration, anonymous accounts that the press attributes to Caputo's team and the group Las Fuerzas del Cielo. This is the layer where fact-checkers and NGOs documented inauthentic accounts, false claims and harassment.

Milei came to politics as a regular economist on TV talk shows, with a small team and a new party, in a country in economic crisis and with voters tired of the two big blocs. TV supplied the raw material; TikTok, YouTube and streaming supplied the distribution.

Platforms

TV shows as raw material

TV interviews and debates were clipped and reposted by fan channels: two thirds of "El Peluca Milei" videos were TV interviews. Television provided the stage and the conflict; clips provided reach among the young.

TikTok

Central channel for under-25s. Run by Gutiérrez and Rolón's team, plus a layer of unofficial accounts. Argentina had 16.2 million adult users in 2023, with about 20 hours of use per month, according to data cited by Amnesty.

YouTube and streaming

Fan channels such as "El Peluca Milei" and long streams such as BreakPoint; after the win, streaming channels such as Neura and Carajo became venues for hours-long interviews and for figures of the libertarian scene.

X and Instagram

Milei ran his X and Instagram accounts himself. X became, according to Amnesty, the preferred tool for accusations against journalists; Agustín Romo looked after the party account.

WhatsApp and volunteers

According to Perfil, Romo coordinated volunteers via WhatsApp; electoral monitoring and digital monitoring were Cerimedo's job.

TV spots and aligned sites

48-second spots in free electoral airtime, for older audiences, and sites such as La Derecha Diario, which Chequeado showed had published false claims.

Local conditions

• Deep economic crisis: the digital coordinators themselves cited 150% annual inflation and about 40% of the population below the poverty line.
• Compulsory voting from age 16, but with no penalty for 16- and 17-year-olds, which gave weight to a teenage audience hard to reach through traditional media.
• New party without a strong local structure: the campaign relied on volunteers and creators, and monitoring polling stations was a stated concern.
• Traditional press with an ageing audience and a hostile relationship: RSF recorded Milei insulting journalists and Chequeado during the campaign.
• Fragmented opposition and last-minute alliances: after the first round, Patricia Bullrich and Mauricio Macri backed Milei.
• AI and fear campaigns used by both sides in the runoff, amid pre-emptive fraud claims.

Nobody published a manual. What follows is the mechanics reconstructed from team interviews, academic research and reporting. It is described here to be understood, not copied.

Three fronts

TV as studio

Milei accepted interviews and debates where conflict was guaranteed; each appearance became dozens of clips. The campaign did not need to produce everything: TV supplied the raw material for free.

Many creators, low costs

A small, young official team, plus fan channels, streamers and unofficial accounts that reposted and remixed. According to Mueve Argentina, unofficial accounts multiplied reach up to tenfold.

Outsider with simple symbols

A named enemy ("la casta"), an easy-to-remember object (the chainsaw for spending cuts) and the language of rupture. For older voters, spots with a calmer tone.

The life cycle of a clip

From TV to feed, each piece followed a similar circuit, according to the sources cited.

1. Scene Interview, debate or stream with a strong line, a clash with the interviewer or a symbolic gesture.
2. Clip Short cut with an aggressive title and captions; half the titles of the biggest fan channel had an aggressive tone, according to UNSAM.
3. Multiplication Posted by the official team and by fan channels, TikTok accounts and streams almost at once.
4. Controversy Reactions from opponents and the press become more content: "let them talk about us", in the words of a team member.
5. Talking to the young Q&As and videos about jobs, independence and money, in the tone of someone talking as an equal.
6. Translation for older voters 48-second spots in electoral airtime, with a calm Milei and party candidates beside him.
7. Attacking critics The part fact-checkers and NGOs documented as abuse: false claims, inauthentic accounts and waves of harassment against journalists, especially women, often started or amplified by Milei's own account.

And again.

Part of what Milei's campaign did is communication skill that any democratic campaign can use transparently. Another part is what fact-checkers, NGOs, courts and the press documented as abuse, and it had costs.

What applied in this case: electoral law, court decisions, inter-American freedom of expression standards and platform rules.

Electoral silence and electoral courts

On 18 May 2025, the Electoral Tribunal of the City of Buenos Aires ordered the fake videos of Macri and Lospennato removed from X, because they could mislead voters and affect a free and informed vote; the prosecutor asked for all copies to be deleted. X had not complied by the date of Chequeado's report.

Electoral offence and criminal investigation

The fake Macri video came under investigation as possible electoral fraud; PRO asked for devices to be seized to identify the authors. No public outcome is known.

Threats and harassment

On 14 August 2025, according to RSF, a prosecutor formally named Milei, government members and followers as suspects over threats and harassment of Julia Mengolini; the investigation is examining whether the campaign was coordinated and paid for with public money. There is no final ruling, and the presumption of innocence applies.

Inter-American standards

Amnesty asked the IACHR and the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression to urge the Argentine state to stop stigmatising speech against journalists; the Rapporteur had already flagged such speech, especially against women, in 2024.

Brazilian electoral justice

The TSE suspended accounts of La Derecha Diario Brasil, a video and Cerimedo's personal account after the 2022 livestream with false claims about the voting machines.

Campaign finance

Official records listed contributions from Cerimedo that he said were duplicated, according to Perfil. Funding and digital services must be declared in full.

Only real, identified people

For democratic campaigns: no fake accounts, bots, bought accounts, deepfakes or undisclosed paid influencers.

Visibility is not votes

TikTok and YouTube views measure reach, not support. Many figures come from the team itself and were not audited.

The economy mattered

The campaign took place amid very high inflation and poverty. The TikTok team's own message was about young people's material problems.

Milei didn't win alone

In the first round he got 29.99% and came second; the 55.65% win came after Bullrich and Macri backed him. Traditional alliances counted as much as the feed.

The apparatus doesn't guarantee wins

On 7 September 2025 the party lost the Buenos Aires province election by almost 14 points, with Caputo's digital group sidelined from the lists and in conflict with Karina Milei. In October it won the midterms, in a context where Trump made financial aid conditional on the win.

Dirt on both sides

In the 2023 runoff, both campaigns used AI images and fear messages, and a manipulated video of Massa circulated without identified authorship. This is not a clean side against a dirty one, but methods no side should use.

Costs for those who did it

Cerimedo was suspended in Brazil, sidelined by the government and detained in Bolivia in 2026; Las Fuerzas del Cielo lost ground in 2025; the president was formally named as a suspect in the Mengolini case, with no final ruling; and Argentina fell in the press freedom ranking.

Five questions on the mechanics, the red lines and the responses. Each answer comes with an explanation.

Case study built from team interviews published by the press, fact-checker investigations, NGO reports, academic research and reporting published between September 2023 and August 2026. All pages were opened and read on 26 October 2026. No source links directly to extremist content.

Updated 26 October 2026